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ABSTRACT
The World Bank (2000) asserts that corruption is the single greatest impediment to economic growth in third  
world countries. This study was set out to investigate the impact of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria  
from 1986 to 2007. A Barro-type endogenous growth model was adopted and reconditioned to suit the purpose  
of the paper. The Engle-Granger (1987) cointegration and error correction mechanism (ECM) techniques  
were employed to unit root properties of the variables, their long run relationship and to determine values of  
long run parameters. The results show that corruption exerts significant direct effect on economic growth and  
indirectly via some critical variables examined by the paper which include Government Capital Expenditure,  
Human Capital Development and Total employment. The paper discovers that about 20% of the increase in  
government capital expenditure ends up in private pockets.  It is, therefore, recommended that the government  
should consolidate on its efforts to fight corruption to a standstill in the country.
 
1 . 0    I n t r o d u c t i o n
Though corruption was not given an explicit recognition in the traditional economic growth theories, it 
has  now become a  globally  recognized  policy  variable  especially  in  less  developed countries  where  it  is 
considered more critical for the attainment of long-term economic growth and sustainable development. Over 
the years, several studies including Mauro (1997) Akkihal, Smith & Adkins (1997) and Voskanyan (2000) have 
shown that corruption is capable of generating undesirable results even from excellent economic policies and 
development plans. Little wonder, World Bank (2000) identified corruption as the single greatest obstacle to 
economic and social development as it distorts the rule of law and weakens the institutional foundations which 
economic growth depends.  Corruption has also been described as a deadly virus that attacks the vital structures 
that makes for a society’s progressive functioning. This is clearly the case in a developing country like Nigeria, 
where limited resources that are initially earmarked for industries, hospitals, schools and other infrastructure 
are either out rightly embezzled, misappropriated, or otherwise severely depleted through kickbacks and over-
invoicing by government officials (Gire, 2001). Unfortunately, Nigeria has consistently been classified as a 
leading icon among the most corrupt nations of the world based on the annual Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) of the Transparency International (TI). Hence, the pressing need for the government, policy makers and 
academics to pay keen attention to the issue of corruption and its attendant effects in Nigeria.
There exist a plethora of studies assessing the relationship between corruption and economic growth but 
their findings have not only been diverse but also conflicting. This implies that views on corruption-economic 
growth  nexus  remain  polarized  among  economists  and  policy  makers.  A  school  of  thought  made  up  of 
proponents  like Leff  (1964),  Huntington (1968),  Summers (1977)  and Lui (1985),  are  of the opinion that 
corruption is beneficial grease that lubricates the engine of economic growth. For Instance, Acemoglou and 
Verdier (1998) argue that some degree of corruption may be part of the optimal allocation of resources in the 
presence of incomplete contracts or due to market failure. This opinion is partly justified on the ground that 
illegal  payments  are  required  to  make  things  pass  swifter  and  favorably  through  the  state  bureaucracy 
(Amundsen, 2000). By implication, corruption has the potency of making an economic agent more efficient and 
in the long run it promotes economic growth.
On the contrary, the second school of thought contends that corruption exerts adverse effects on long-
term  economic  growth  and  sustainable  development.  A  host  of  scholars  and  international  organizations 
constitute the proponents of this view. Specifically, Amaro-Reyes (1983), Mauro (1995), UNDP (1997), Wei 
(1997), Kaufmann (1997), World Bank (2000) among others hold the opinion that corruption has a corrosive 
effects on economic growth and development. The transmission mechanism of these adverse effects include 
declined domestic and foreign investment, increased cost of production, misallocation of national resources, 
increased  inequality  and  poverty,  uncertainty  in  decision  making  among  others.  Overwhelming  statistical 
evidence supporting this claim exists in numerous recent studies.
Some writers argue that the public servants contrive set of rules or over apply existing ones to perpetrate 
corruption. According to Wei (1998) and Tanzi (1998) state that labyrinthine government regulations create 
fertile  grounds for government  officials  to  extract  rents,  whereas an economy where government’s  role  is 
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minimal is less likely to breed corruption. Mauro (1995) and Kaufmann and Wei (1998) show that corruption 
index and the index of government regulation are positively correlated.  
Given this knowledge gap, the main objective of this study is to assess the impact of corruption on 
economic growth in Nigeria via its effects on physical capital, human capital and labor. While introduction 
occupies section one, the rest of the paper is decomposed into four sections. Section two covers review of 
related empirical literature and theoretical issues while section three presents the methodology of the paper. 
Section four captures presentation and analysis of results and the final section, which is section five, contains 
summary and recommendations of the paper. 
 
2.0  REVIEW OF RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
There is no consensus on the exact meaning of corruption. Many writers have defined it differently 
under different conditions to encompass a wide range of conduct of misconduct. For instance, El- Rufai (2002) 
opines  that  corruption  covers  a  wide  range  of  social  misconduct  raging  from  massive  fraud,  extortion, 
embezzlement,  bribery,  nepotism,  influence peddling,  bestowing of  favors  to  friends,  rigging of  elections, 
abuse of public property, sale of fake or expired drugs, etc. Blackburn  et al (2002) describe corruption as a 
clandestine activity which takes place away from the glare of publicity and which, therefore is difficult to 
measure empirically. Painstakingly, Rose-Ackerman (1999) laments that corruption exists when institutions 
established to regulate the interrelationships between the citizens and the state are used instead for personal 
enrichment and provision of benefits to the corrupt and undeserving.
Besides, there numerous recent empirical  studies that have investigated the effects of corruption on 
economic growth in different countries. Beginning with the pioneering work of Mauro (1995) which examined 
the effect of corruption on growth rates of per capital GDP of sixteen countries from 1960-1985. The result of 
this systematic study shows that one-standard deviation decline in the corruption index leads to an increase in 
annual growth rates of GDP per capital by 0.8 percent. In yet another study Mauro (1997) shows that the size 
and  composition  of  government  expenditure  is  significantly  affected  by  corruption.  The  study  found that 
corruption tends to make public expenditure neglects education and health in favor of sectors where corruption 
might not be perceived easily. This will have adverse effect on growth in the long run. In the same vein, Tanzi 
and Davoodi (1997) investigated the effect of corruption on the size and composition of public expenditure and 
came up with multiple findings which according to Akai et al (2005) include the following.
 a.  Corruption tends to increase the size of public investment such that the items of the expenditure are 
easily manipulated by high level official to obtain bribe.
b.  Corruption skews the composition of public expenditure away from needed operations and 
maintenance towards expenditure on new equipment.
c.  Like the findings of Mauro (1997), corruption skews composition of public expenditure away from 
needed health and education funds.
d.   Corruption reduces the productivity of public investment and that of the country’s infrastructure.
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e. Corruption has the tendency to reduce tax revenue because it compromises the government’s ability 
to collect taxes and tariffs.
Rahman et al (1999) examined the impact of corruption on the economic growth and Gross Domestic 
Investments of Bangladesh. The overall result of the study indicates that corruption reduces economic growth 
by reducing Foreign Direct  Investments (FDI).  Similarly,  Mauro (1998) found that  corruption also affects 
domestic investments negatively and economic growth is adversely affected in the long run. Also, Wei (1997) 
using data  set  from fourteen (14)  countries found that  the prevalence of corruption in  a  recipient  country 
discourage foreign investment. He obtained the coefficients –0.09 and –9.92 for corruption and host country’s 
marginal tax rate respectively.
Furthermore, Mo (2001) estimated a direct and indirect effect of corruption on economic growth using a 
long term growth rates of per capital GDP from 1970 to 1985. The study identifies three transmission channels 
namely, investment, human capital and political stability. A regression is run using the corruption perception 
index of Transparency International, variables measuring the three transmission channels and other control 
variables. The result indicates that one unit increase in the corruption index reduces the growth rate by about 
0.545 percentage point. However, the direct effect of corruption becomes insignificant in both ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation after controlling other variables. A strand of 
studies has also shown the link between corruption and poverty. For instance, Rose-Ackerman (1997) found 
that corruption aggravates the problem of poverty through the following channels.
a.       The poor will receive a lower level of social services.
b.      Infrastructure investment will be biased against projects that will aid the poor.
c.       The poor may face higher tax or fewer services.
d.       The poor are disadvantaged in selling their agricultural produce.
e.       Their ability to escape poverty using indigenous small-scale enterprise is diminished.
 
Similarly, Gupta et al (1998) found that corruption increases income inequality and poverty by lowering 
economic growth, promoting a biased tax system in favor of the rich few, lowering social spending, reducing 
access to education and reducing the effectiveness of targeting social programs. Treisman (2000) discovers that 
rich countries are generally rated as having less corruption than poor countries with as much as 50 to 73% of 
variations in corruption indices accounted for by variations in per capita income levels. 
            Empirical evidence suggests that corruption affects economic growth in two ways: first, there appears to 
be a robust negative correlation between level of corruption and economic growth, Gould and Amaro-Reynes 
(1983) Mauro (1995, 1997), United Nations (1989), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) find evidence that bureaucratic 
malpractice manifests in the diversion of public funds to where bribes are easiest to collect, implying a bias in 
the  composition  of  public  funds  towards  low-productivity  projects  at  the  expense  of  value  enhancing 
investments.  Second,  there  is  a  two-way  causal  relationship  between  corruption  and  economic  growth: 
bureaucratic rent-seeking not only influences, but is also influenced by the level of development. 
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Also, Abed and Davoodi (2002) examined the impact of corruption in transition economies using a 
panel and cross-sectional data for twenty-five (25) countries over the period of 1994-1998. The results show 
that higher economic growth is associated with lower corruption in both panel and cross-sectional regressions 
and it shows significance at one percent level. Also, Rock and Bonett (2004) found that corruption significantly 
promotes economic growth in the newly industrializing economies of East Asia including China, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Korea. And although Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) found that the negative effect of corruption 
on economic growth, the coefficients of the 2SLS regression model were insignificant. Aliyu (2007) using 
distributed lag model in a study on democracy, corruption and economic development in Nigeria found strong 
evidence suggesting that democratic regime promotes economic growth and development. The study could not 
find strong evidence suggesting positive or adverse relationship between corruption and development in the 
sample.
  It follows from above that empirical studies indicate at best, mixed and in some instance, conflicting 
results. This can be attributed in part to problems of methodology in these studies. For instance, some of those 
studies  used cross-national  data  thereby making it  difficult  to  control  for  a  number  of  cultural,  historical, 
institutional, and qualitative differences in administrative rules and practices among others.
 
2.1      THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Various  theories  of  economic  growth  ranging  from the  classical  to  the  endogenous  theories  were 
propounded to identify and explain the various variables influencing growth. While the classical theorists laid 
much emphasis on capital as major determinant of economic growth, neoclassical extended the Harrod-Domar 
classical formulation by the inclusion of labor and the introduction of a third independent variable, technology, 
to the growth equation, (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). Two major drawbacks of this theory include (i) the 
impossibility of analyzing the determinants of technological progress within its framework. (ii) the failure of 
the model to explain the large differences in the residuals across countries with similar technologies. These led 
to a widespread discontentment with the neoclassical models (Todaro, 2003)
Endogenous Growth Models were developed as a response to the criticisms of the neoclassical growth 
model and to offer better explanation of the process of long-run economic growth. The theory views innovation 
brought  about  by investment in knowledge generation as the driving force of long term economic growth 
(Romer, 1986). More importantly, variants of endogenous growth models including Lucas (1988) Model, Jones 
and Manelli (1990) Model, Barro (1990) Model, AK models of Rebelo (1991) etc, have demonstrated that 
policy variables can have significant impact on long-run economic growth. This paper adopts the famous Barro 
(1990) model which is an outgrowth of Ram (1986) model. This is because the model permits the inclusion of a 
wider range of policy variables including corruption. This model provides both the theoretical foundation and 
analytical tool for analysis of impact of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria. The model assumes the 
economy is comprised of public sector (G) and Private sector (P). Since the investment by the public sector in 
infrastructure  can  make  private  sector  more  profitable,  it  is  assumed  that  the  output  of  (G)  exerts  some 
externalities on the output of the private sector. The model also assumes that government levies an income tax 
and runs a balanced budget. It uses a production function of the form
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               Y = Gβ Kα L1-α                                                                                     (1)
Where:    Y = Total output of the economy
                G = Public sector input                     
                K = Private physical capital
                L = Labor input
                    α = Contribution of capital to 
                           aggregate output
 
                 1- α = Share of output per worker
                 β = Contribution of public sector to 
                        aggregate output
                     G = tY (government is assumed to 
                            levy tax and run balanced 
                             budget)
 
                 tY = t Gβ Kα L1-α
The production function of the Public Sector (G) is given as:
                G = g(Lg, Kg)                                                                                    (2) 
 While that of the Private Sector is given as:
      P = p(Lp, Kp, G)                                                                                    (3)
The Total factor inputs
                 LT = Lg + Lp                                                                                     (4)
                  KT = Kg + Kp                                                                                  (5)
Subscripts g, p and T relate to the input of public sector, private sector and aggregate economy respectively. 
       Since the total output of the economy is a function of output in both public and private sector
   Y = g( Lg + Kg ) + p( Lp + Kp + G)                                                              (6)
      = Lg + Lp + Kg + Kp + G
      The model is modified in this study to include corruption, therefore we have
  Y = KT + LT + G + C                 (7)
   Y   = αKT + (1- α)LT + βG + λC                                                                    (8)
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Equation (8) is the estimated equation 
 Where λ measures the effect of corruption on aggregate output   
3.0  MODEL SPECIFICATION
In line with studies by Mo (2001) and Anorou and Braha (2004) in which they identified the direct and 
indirect effects of corruption on economic growth and in line with above specification of Barro’s model, this 
paper adopts the endogenous growth model. Like it was said earlier, the model permits the inclusion of more 
policy variables in economic growth equation. Specifically, the model was modified to include the corruption 
index as one of its explanatory variables. Relevant equations were formulated to capture the disaggregated 
effects of corruption on economic growth. In all four different specifications/ equations were formulated and 
these are given as follows:
GDP = f(GCE, TEM, TSE, COR)
 The regression form of the model is written as:
Y = αO+ α1GCEt + α2TEMt + α3TSEt + ……
+ α4CORt + µ (9) 
Where: α1, α2, α3 > 0;   α4 < > 0             
GDP = Gross Domestic Product (a proxy for economic growth)
TSE = Tertiary School Enrolment (proxy for human capital)
GCE = Capital Expenditure (a proxy for physical capital)
TEM = Total Employment figure (a proxy for labor)
COR = Corruption Perception Index
α0 = Constant term,  α1 = Coefficient of GEX,  α2 = Coefficient of TEM,  α3 = Coefficient of TSE,  α4 = 
Coefficient of COR and µ  = Error term
Equation (9) above captures the direct effect corruption on economic growth. In addition, equations (10 – 12) 
below were formulated to account for the indirect effect of corruption. 
To assess the effect of corruption on physical capital we use the equation;
   GCEt = β0 + β1TSEt + β2TEMt + β3CORt + µ (10)
 Where: β0, β2, β3 > 0, β1 < or > 0
 To assess the effect of corruption on human capital we adopt the equation;
   TSEt = b0 + b1GCEt + b2TEMLt + b3CORt + µt  (11)
 Where: a0, b2, b3 > 0, b1 < or > 0
To assess the effect of corruption on labor we adopt the equation;
  TEMt = γ0 + γ 1GCEt + γ 2TSEt + γ 3CORt + µt (12)  
 Where: γ0, γ3 > 0, γ2< 0, γ1< or > 0 
 
3.1   Definition and Measurement of Variables
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
This is the socio-economic indicator that is used to measure economic growth of a country. It is the value of all 
final goods and services produced within the geographical boundary of a given nation during a specified period 
of one year divided by consumer price index. This was converted into natural log and was differenced once
 Government Capital Expenditure (GCE)
These are expenditure on the provision of capital and development projects by the Federal government. This is 
made up of expenditure incurred on the construction of basic infrastructure like roads, bridges, power stations 
etc., investment in plants and machinery etc. This was obtained from the publications of Statistical Bulletin of 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). 
 Total Employment (TEM)
The number of people, both male and female, that were employed in a particular country. It consists of both 
full-time and part-time workers. Data on this was sourced from the annual publications of the Nigerian Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS).
Tertiary School Enrolment (TSE)
It is defined as the number of students attending tertiary institutions in a given country. Tertiary institutions are 
comprised of universities, Polytechnic and colleges of education, Todaro (2003).  It  served as a proxy for 
human capital in the model.
Corruption Perception Index (COR)
This  is  a  composite  index  based  on  the  surveys  of  business  experts  and  analysts  giving  insight  into  the 
perceived level of corruption in many countries. The Transparency International has consistently published this 
index annually since 1995 and it has been used to measure corruption in recent studies.
 
3.3      Estimation Techniques
This study employed quantitative tools  of data  analysis  and interpretations were based on standard 
econometrics principles. First, a unit root test was conducted to determine the time series properties of data 
collected on GDP, physical capital, human capital, total employment and corruption perception index. This is 
with a view to establish whether there is the presence of unit root in the series because when time series data is 
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characterized by a unit root or in other words is non-stationary, regression analysis conducted in a conventional 
way, yield spurious regression results. This according to Granger and Newbold (1974) is indicated by high 
value of R2 with a low value of Durbin Watson statistic. To this effect, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
test statistic is specified as follows: 
Additionally,  according  to  Engle-Granger  (1987)  state  that  when  variables  were  found  to  be  I(1), 
stationarity  of  residual  (obtained  from a  static  regression)  implies  cointegration.  Meaning  that  a  long run 
equilibrium condition exist between the dependant and independent variables. The residual series is included in 
the  regression  as  an  error  correcting  mechanism.  Long  run  regression  results  are  obtained  by  traditional 
ordinary least square (OLS) technique. 
 
4.1 Empirical Results and Discussion
Results of the ADF test applied to all the variables presented on table 1 show that all the series were 
I(1). The hypothesis of presence of unit root is rejected for all at 5 percent or better level. The decision rule 
states that null hypothesis is rejected when ADF test statistic is greater (in absolute terms) than the MacKinnon 
critical value for each variable. This implies that all the series are stationary as reported below at their first 
difference.
Table 1 
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for Unit Root
Variables ADF Test 
Statistic
Critical 
Values
Order of 
Integration
GDP - 4.51 -2.83* I(1)
GCE -2.41 -1.97** I(1)
TSE -2.73 -1.98** I(1)
TEM -3.27 -3.22** I(1)
COR -3.39 -3.21** I(1)
Source: Computed from E-view 4.0 by the researcher
* indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%
 The next  step to  take is  to conduct  a cointegration test  on the residual  to  investigate  whether  or not  the 
presence of cointegration relationship.
 4.2    Tests for Cointegration
Since all the variables are integrated at their first difference, the next is we employed the Engle-Granger two-
step method to check for any cointegration relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
Residual  obtained from static regression of equations (9),  (10),  (11) and (12) is  tested and the results are 
reported on table 2. 
Table 2:  Engle-Granger Cointegration Test
Variable ADF Test Statistic Critical Value Order of Cointegration
ECM1 -2.11 -1.98** I(0)
ECM2 -4.06 -2.83* I(0)
ECM3 -2.54 -1.98** I(0)
ECM4 -1.67 -1.63*** I(0)
Source: Computed from E-view 4.0 by the researcher
One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5% and 10% respectively
 The result for equation (9) and (11) that are, ECM1, ECM2, above show that the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration is rejected at 5% because the decision rule states that the null hypothesis should be rejected if 
ADF test statistic is greater than critical values in absolute terms. While result of ECM2 shows cointegration at 
1% level of significance, the result of ECM4 shows cointegration at 10% level. The Engle-Granger (1987) two-
step methodology provides that if residuals are stationary integrated of order zero, that is, I(0) then the variables 
that generated the residuals are said to be cointegrated.   Thus, we conclude that there exist stable long run 
equilibrium relationships  among  variables  in  the  specified  equations.  The  next  step  in  the  Engle-Granger 
criteria  is  to  estimate  the  dynamic  model  by  incorporating  the  adjustment  variable  of  error  correction 
mechanism on the list of regressors. 
 
4.3    Results of Dynamic Error Correction Model
 Effect of Corruption, Physical and Human Capital and Labor on Economic Growth)
The long run specification of equation 9 produces a parsimonious error correction model through an 
iterative process with the following results presented on table 3. The results show that on the overall, the model 
is very robust  and exhibits  a  strong predictive power with a  goodness measure,  that  is,  the coefficient  of 
multiple determination (R2) at 0.99. This implies that 99% of the total variation in Nigeria’s RGDP is explained 
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by variables captured in the model while remaining 1% change in RGDP is accounted for by other variables 
outside the model. The goodness of fit of the model is further confirmed by an adjusted R2 of 0.98 meaning that 
98% of variation in the dependent variable is accounted for by our regressors inclusive of the error correcting 
variable. 
 Secondly,  Durbin-Watson  statistic  of  1.78  indicates  the  absence  of  autocorrelation  at  1% level  of 
significance. Also our F-statistic, which tests for overall significance of the regressors, shows that the variables 
in the model are jointly significant statistically at 99% level of confidence. 
 Table 3 
Estimated Parsimonious Error Correction Model 
(Dependent Variable: DLOG (RGDP)) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
C -0.0729 -20.76*
DLOG(TSE(-4)) -0.0196 -2.13***
DLOG(GCE) -0.1408 -12.74*
DLOG(TEM(-3)) 0.1273 3.25**
D(COR(-1)) -0.0369 -2.44**
ECM1(-1)
-0.6783 - 9.21*
R2 0.996  
Adjusted R2 0.988  
D.W statistic 1.79  
F-calculated 124.7  
Probability of F-stat 0.008  
Source: Computed from E-view 4.0 by the researcher
One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
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 At specific levels, the estimate of error correction variable, the adjustment parameter is theoretically 
consistent and statistically significant at 1% level. This shows a very fast and robust speed of adjustment in the 
model. The coefficient of corruption reveals that there is a negative relationship between economic growth and 
corruption. The value of the coefficient suggests that a unit rise in corruption by 1 percentage point in Nigeria 
would reduce economic growth by about 4%. This result is consistent with the findings of Mauro (1998), Mo 
(2001), Anoruo and Braha (2004), but, inconsistent with that of Aliyu (2007). 
           The model estimate also shows a positive relation between labor and economic growth. This implies that 
an  increase  in  labor  employment  would  bring  about  increase  in  productivity  or  economic  growth.  The 
coefficient of the estimate is statistically significant at 5% level of significance. Furthermore, our result shows 
that the coefficients of tertiary school enrolment (TSE) and government capital expenditure (GCE) do not have 
the expected signs, although they were all statistically significant at 10 and 1% respectively. This could be as a 
result of the presence of corruption in the model, which is expected to impact negatively on both variables.
 
The effect of Corruption, Human Capital and Labor on Physical Capital
This subsection analyses the effect of corruption (COR), human capital  (TSE) and labor (TEM) on 
physical capital, that is, on government’s capital expenditure (GCE). Already in the previous section the Engle-
Granger (1987) methodology has established a cointegration relationship between the variables in the model. A 
parsimonious model from equation (10) was arrived at through an iterative process and the results are presented 
on table 4.
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Table 4: Result of Parsimonious Error Correction Model
Dependent Variable: LOG(DGCE)
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
C 0.0571 0.772
DLOG[TSE(-1)] 0.7471 2.63**
DLOG[TEM(-1)] -1.3986 -1.82
D[COR(-1)] 0.197 1.13
ECM2(-1) -1.6512 -5.41*
R2 0.8487  
Adjusted R2 0.7478
 
D.W 1.65
 
F-statistic 8.41
 
Probability of F-stat 0.012
 
Source: Computed from E-view 4.0 by the researcher
One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
 The measures of credibility of the model, which are R2, D.W and F-test all indicate that the model is 
robust and of good fit. The coefficient of multiple determination (R2) is very strong at 0.848 meaning, about 
85% of the variation in government capital expenditure is explained jointly by the regressors. The value of D.W 
shows absence of autocorrelation in the model. Furthermore, the value of F-statistic of 8.41 shows that our 
regressors are jointly significant at 1% level.
Specifically, the results show that the coefficient of corruption, although not statistically significant, 
impacts positively on the level of government capital expenditure. Corruption has a coefficient of 0.197 and 
this shows that a unit rise in corruption level will induce increase expenditure by about 20%, which raises that 
possibility of corruption. This result lends credence to the findings of Mauro (1995) and Davoodi (1997) who 
argue that  corruption skews the composition of  public  expenditure  away from needed operations,  such as 
education and health, towards expenditure on new equipments.
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 The results also indicate that TSE is positively related to capital expenditure with a coefficient of 0.74. 
This  implies  that  an  increase  in  school  enrolment  by  one  thousand  would  bring  about  a  rise  in  capital 
expenditure by N7.4m.  This result is statistically significant at 5% given a calculated t-statistic of 2.63 against 
a theoretical t value of 2.26. Results further reveal that TEM figures impact negatively on capital expenditure, 
although the coefficient is statistically significant.
Finally, the coefficient of the error term ECM2 associated with equation (10) wears a correct sign. It 
indicates that 165% of the shock is eroded in very subsequent year which implies a fast adjustment process of 
the previous year shock back to the equilibrium. 
The Effect of Corruption, Physical Capital and Total Employment on Human Capital
This subsection examines the effect of corruption, physical capital and employment level on human 
capital. Equation (11) was enlarged to incorporate the error correcting variable and through iterative method, 
the following results on table 5 from a parsimonious error correction model were arrived at. 
Table 5 : Result of Parsimonious Error Correction Model
Dependent Variable: DLOG (TSE)
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
C 0.083 2.75
DLOG(GCE) 0.340 4.59*
DLOG[TEM(-1)] -0.919 -2.85
D[COR(-1)] -0.481 -4.91*
ECM3(-1) -0.749 -3.55*
R2 0.884  
Adjusted R2 0.792
 
D.W 1.30
 
F-statistic 9.58
 
Probability of F-stat 0.026
 
Source: Computed from E-view 4.0 by the researcher          -One asterisk indicates significance at 1%.
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Our model indicates a strong R2 at 0.88, which implies that 88% of the total variation in tertiary school 
enrolment (TSE) is jointly explained by the regressors contained in the model. If we further consider an 
Adjusted R2 of 0.79, we can safely conclude that our model has a good fit. The regressors altogether, are 
statistically significant given a computed value of F-statistic of 9.58 is significant at 1percent level. However, 
our D.W statistic of 1.30 reveals the presence of autocorrelation in the model. The presence of autocorrelation 
undermines the efficiency of the model, but does not affect the unbaisedness and consistency properties of the 
model.
 The  model  also  reveals  a  significant  negative  relationship  between  corruption  and  human  capital 
development such that a unit increase in the level of corruption will reduce tertiary enrolment by about 5%. The 
result is not surprising because national resources that would have been used to expand the capacity of our 
existing tertiary institutions and possibly build new ones are unrepentantly siphoned or embezzled by corrupt 
public servants. This no doubt exerts deleterious effect on economic growth in the long run. Our t-statistic 
suggests that the impact is statistically significant at 0.05 levels of significance. In addition, the result shows 
that  government  capital  expenditure  has  a  positive impact  on human capital  development  in  Nigeria.  The 
implication is that a unit increase in government spending on education will enhance the ability of tertiary 
institution to absorb more students into the system by up to 34%.
 However, the result shows an inverse relationship between the level of total employment and tertiary 
school enrolment, although the coefficient of the former is not significant statistically. This is because working 
and schooling  are  to  a  certain  extent  mutually  exclusive.  Besides,  level  of  unemployment  among  school 
leavers, in recent years is on the high increase. Lastly, the coefficient of the error correcting variable, ECM3, 
bears the expected sign and the value suggests that there is a fast adjustment process of the previous year’s 
shock.
The Effect of Corruption, Human Capital and Tertiary School Enrolment on Labor
The last category of effect  examined by the paper is that  of corruption,  human capital  and tertiary school 
enrolment on the level of employment of labor. While theoretically, the coefficient of corruption is less and that 
of tertiary school enrolment is greater than zero; that of human capital may assume any sign between negative 
and positive. The result of the dynamic specification of equation (12), which incorporates the error correcting 
term, is presented on table 6 as follows. 
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Result of Parsimonious Error Correction Model
Dependent Variable: DLOG (TEM)
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
C 0.077 11.08*
DLOG(GCE(
-4))
0.035 2.10
DLOG(TSE(-
4))
-0.199 -6.66*
D(COR(-1)) -0.155 -6.95*
ECM4(-1)
-0.326 -4.41*
R2 0.975  
Adjusted R2 0.941  
D.W statistic 1.20  
F-calculated 28.92  
Probability of F-
stat
0.009  
Source: Computed from E-view 4.0 by the researcher
One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
 
Like in the previous models, the above model has a good fit and the same robustness considering the 
high value of R2 and adjusted R2  of 0.97 and 0.94 respectively. F-statistic is significant at 1% level and its 
probability is low. The D. W statistic however reveals the incidence of autocorrelation in the model. 
At the level of the coefficients, the results show a strong negative relationship between corruption and total 
employment. The result is both statistically significant and consistent theoretically. This finding implies that as 
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the level corruption increases in the Nigeria, the level of employment falls. The results further reveal a positive 
link  between  government  capital  expenditure  on  total  employment.  This  outcome  was  too  expected 
theoretically and is plausible with the facts on grounds. That the case in most developing economies is that 
government plays an indispensable role of steering the economy through its spending in the economy. This 
explains why there is the spate of wide fiscal dominance in these economies. 
However, the coefficient of tertiary enrolment did not have the expected sign, perhaps due to the anticipated 
adverse effect of corruption on tertiary enrolment. The error correction variable, ECM4, has the expected sign 
and is significant statistically at 1% level. The coefficient’s value suggests that 32% of the shock will be eroded 
in every subsequent year. Thus there is a fast adjustment process from the previous year’s shock.
5.0 Conclusions and Recommendations
The primary objective of this study is to critically assess the impact of corruption on economic growth 
in Nigeria from 1986 to 2007. To achieve this broad goal, the core channels through which corruption affects 
growth were identified in both the literature and empirical studies. These channels include government capital 
expenditure, human capital development and total employment. A Barro-type endogenous growth model was 
used to  estimate the relationship.  First,  our results  show that  corruption has significant  negative effect  on 
economic  growth.  The  study  also  found  that  corruption  exerts  negative  impact  on  both  human  capital 
development and total employment, but it positively impacts on government capital expenditure. The positive 
effect of corruption on capital expenditure is, however, not surprising because public expenditure figure will 
always be inflated with the intention of siphoning or embezzling a reasonable proportion of the total value; see 
Mauro (1997) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997). In fact our results reveal that as much as 20 percent of the entire 
capital expenditure may end up private pockets. Summing up, the paper discovers that corruption exerts both 
direct and indirect negative effects economic growth in Nigeria.
To reverse this, the paper recommends that the government should intensify its efforts at re-orientating 
the society against ills of corruption by establishing high ethical standards to which all and sundry must adhere. 
More stringent measures should be put in place to reduce the possibility of diverting public funds into private 
pockets. For instance, independent auditing and consulting firms can be involved to critically examine the 
records and projects being carried out by the government officials to ascertain whether they are executed as 
planned. Finally, government should increase its political will to eradicate corruption in the system. Present 
efforts  already  yielding  good  results  should  be  strengthened  and  expanded  in  scope.  The  Economic  and 
Financial  Crime  Commission  (EFCC),  for  instance  should  be  given  more  legal  backing,  manpower  and 
financial resources to improve its performance now and in the future.
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